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M
r. Bäcker makes the valuable point that the role of political and sociopo-
litical factors in countries’debt servicing performance needs to be con-
sidered. The IMF Working Paper version of our IMF Staff Papers article
(Aylward and Thorne, 1998) dealt with the political environment, via three
approaches. These included (1) comparing the incidence of adverse or irregular
political events (i.e., frequent or sudden changes of government, civil war, or
civil unrest) in the countries making late repayments to the IMF versus those
making timely repayments; (2) contrasting the two groups according to a coun-
try political risk indicator published by a private country risk analysis firm; and
(3) searching for temporal links between a country’s political circumstances
and the interruption of timely repayments to the IMF. While the latter approach
was the most subjective, requiring a case study approach, its results nonetheless
are worth noting. In about half of the 30 incidences of protracted arrears to the
IMF that were analyzed, political events that may have influenced a country’s
external debt repayment performance could be temporally linked to the emer-
gence of repayment problems vis-à-vis the IMF. But such an association could
not be established in numerous other country cases for the reason that strongly
unfavorable political conditions had persisted for many years before the emer-
gence of arrears. In other cases, countries exhibited a continuously high level
of political instability over a long period but incurred IMF arrears only inter-
mittently, and then for a relatively moderate duration. Moreover, some of these
countries went on to become and remain current with the IMF even while the
same difficult conditions (e.g., a civil war) persisted. Thus, it is difficult to
identify “turning points” when it could be judged that the cumulative impact of
political difficulties either became bad enough to contribute significantly to the
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interruption of payments to the IMF, or improved sufficiently to explain an exit
from arrears. Casting a wider net than just repayment performance vis-à-vis the
IMF, Rivoli and Brewer (1997) found that for 199 rescheduling events over the
period 1980–90, armed conflict was a significant predictor of debt servicing
difficulties, while indicators of governmental regime change and of govern-
mental legitimacy consistently lacked predictive power. 
It is worth noting that the types of political circumstances considered in
Aywlard and Thorne (1998) and Rivoli and Brewer (1977) are quite different
from those that interest Mr. Bäcker (1998). Since his basic approach is that
government chooses a debt-service level that maximizes the support for its pol-
icy among a population composed of distinct groups of citizens who assess dif-
ferently the costs and benefits of sovereign debt repayment, the recent work of
Bussière and Mulder (1999) may be more relevant. In testing for the influence
of political instability on economic vulnerability specifically in the context of
the 1994 and 1997 economic crisis episodes, these authors construct variables
for political polarization, the political cohesion of the government, electoral
indecision, and the impact of the timing of elections. They find that political
instability has a strong impact on economic vulnerability in countries with
weak economic fundamentals, while countries with a sound economic envi-
ronment are only marginally affected by political instability as measured by
these variables.
A quick conclusion based on these studies is that while politics clearly mat-
ters for countries’ economic performance, how, why, and when it matters is not
easy to explain. Much interesting work remains to be done in modeling how polit-
ical factors impact debt servicing, growth rates, susceptibility to currency crises,
and other facets of economic performance.
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